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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MADSONIA REALTY CO~fp ANY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
ZION'S SAV1NGS BANK & TRUST 
COMPANY, a corporation, as ex-
ecutor of the Estate of Richard vV. 
~fadsen, deceased, and LaReta C. 
l\fadsen, 
Defenda!nts awd Appellants. 
Case No. 7589 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AXD APPELLANTS 
STATE~IENT OF FACTS 
In the course of the probation of the estate of R. W. 
Madsen, the plaintiff in this action, l\1adsonia Realty 
Company, a corporation, filed a petition for an order 
directing the executor to execute a deed to certain prop-
erty known as 667 East 1st South Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, and also described in the petition as follows: 
''Commencing at the Southeast corner of Lot 
1, Block 60, Plat 'B', Salt Lake City Survey, and 
running thence North 160 feet: thence \Vest 99 
feet; thence South 160 feet; thence East 99 feet 
to the place of beginning.'' 
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The petitioner alleged that "on or about the 1st day 
of January, 1937, R. W. ~Iadsen sold to petitioner, Mad-
sonia Realty Company,'' the aforesaid land. Madsonia 
further alleged that no formal deed was ever executed 
and delivered by said R. W. :Madsen to l\Iadsonia Realty 
Company, but there was an agreed price of Ten Thousand 
Six Hundred Eighty Dollars ($10,680.00), which was 
paid by said Madsonia Realty Company to R. W. :Mad-
sen; that at the time of said sale R. W. Madsen was 
president of :Madsonia Realty Company, and was its 
general manager, and said R. W. Madsen also kept the 
account books of said corporation; that as of January 
1, 1937, said R. W. :Madsen, as general manager of said 
corporation and as the bookkeeper thereof, made a record 
of sale by entering the same on the journal and ledger 
account of said corporation; that no actual cash or money 
was delivered to said R. W. Madsen, but his account was 
credited in the amount of said purchase price and the 
property was thereby paid for in full. (R. 3, 4) 
Petitioner prayed that the Court direct the executor 
to execute a deed to petitioner to the aforesaid property. 
(R. 5) Subsequently the defendant LaReta C. Madsen 
filed a demurrer and ans,wer to this petition, and an 
answer was filed in behalf of the executor. The Court 
thereupon directed that the matter be transferred from 
the Probate to the Civil Division of the court, and that 
the matter be tried as a civil suit against the estate of 
Mr. Madsen. (R. 1) 
The real property involved was the home of R. W. 
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Madsen and his first '"ife. He inherited it from his 
mother and it was considered the family homestead. 
Richard 'V. :J[adsen and LaReta C. Madsen were 
married on October 30, 1935, and they continued to be 
husband and wife until the time of the death of R. W. 
:Madsen on ~lay 17, 1948. (R. 71) 
L€tters testamentary were issued to Zion's Savings 
Bank and Trust Company, as the executor of the Last 
Will and Testament of R. W. l\Iadsen, and at the time of 
the hearing this bank was acting as the executor. (R. 71) 
The Court found that R. W. l\Iadsen was the sole owner 
of the premises at the time of the marriage to LaReta 
C. l\{adsen, and that on the 1st day of January, 1937, he 
''by oral agreement sold to :petitioner, Madsonia Realty 
Company, the property described . . . for the purchase 
price of Ten Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Dollars 
($10,680.00); that R. W. Madsen evidenced such sale by 
entering the same on the books of Madsonia Realty Com-
pany in his own handwriting, he being the president, gen-
eral manager and bookkeeper of said company." (R. 71) 
T·he Court found that he received the full consideration 
but failed to execute or deliver a deed to the property. (R. 
71) The court found that between January 31, 1937, and 
June 6, 1946, the corporation collected all of the rents, 
paid all of the taxes and paid for the upkeep :and repair . 
of the property. (R. 71, 72) 
The Court further found: "That on the 6th day of 
June, 1946, said property was sold to James 0. Peterson 
and C. Amelia Peterson, his wife, for the price of Sixteen 
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4 
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ( $16,500.00) ; that said 
eontract of sale was evidenced by an instrument in writ-
his wife, as buyers, and R. W. Madsen and LaReta C. 
ing signed by James 0. Peterson and C. Amelia Peterson, 
~Iadsen, as sellers; that said R. W. Madsen was in fa:ct 
acting for and on behalf of Madsonia Realty Company 
in the signing of said contract of sale; thatR. W. Madsen 
entered the sale of said property on the books of Mad-
sonia Realty Company and credited said buyers on the 
books of Madsonia Re·alty Company with $4,000.00, being 
the down payment on said contract." (R. 72) The con-
tract provides for monthly payments of $125.00, and 
the Court found that at the time of the death of R. W. 
Madsen there was a principal balance owing in the 
amount of Ten Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty Dollars 
and eleven cents ($10,730.11). (R. 72) All of the money 
paid by the Petersons under the contract went to Mad-
sonia. None of it was kept by Mr. Madsen personally. 
(R.. 72, 73) 
The Court found: "That neither at the time of the 
execution of the Peterson contract on or about June 6, 
1946, nor at any time prior thereto, did the defendant 
LaReta C. ::Madsen know that Madsonia Realty Company 
had or claimed any right, title or interest in or to the 
aforesaid property; that at no time did R. W. :Madsen 
personally, or did any other agent, officer or employee 
of Madsonia Realty Company, take any step whatsoever 
-to put LraReta C. Madsen on notice of any claim or in-
terest by the said corporation.'' (R. 74) 
ili: 
[: 
~~ 
t~! 
I 
in1 
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At the ti1ne of the bookkeeping entry on January 
1, 1937, LaReta C. ~ladsen did not promise or ag-ree to 
make any conveyance to the corporation or anyone else. 
In fact, she did not eYen know of th~ book entry or of 
any alleged transaction between R. vV. Madsen and the 
corporation. At the time of the execution of the Peterson 
contract, neither :Jirs. :Madsen nor ~f r. Madsen received 
any consideration. The Court found that the sole con-
sideration and pay1nent went to the corporation, and that 
R. W. Madsen was simply acting as the trustee or in 
some other fiduciary capacity to the corporation in ex-
ecuting the contract. 
The Court found that l\1.rs. Madsen signed the Peter-
son contract for the purpose of releasing her statutory 
distributive share pursuant to Section 101-3-4 of the 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, and that she did in fact re-
lease her dower interest. (R. 73) 
R. W. Madsen left a Last Will and Testament which 
was admitted to probate and the Court found that ''La-
Reta C. Madsen has elected to take under S'aid Will and 
does not renounce the provisions thereof in her favor.'' 
(R. 73) The Court also found "that by electing to ac-
cept the provisions of the said will, said LaReta C. 
Madsen is not estopped and barred from claiming an 
interest in the p-roperty hereinabove described by n~aso~1 
of statutory dower or otherwise. (R. 73) 
The provision of the will is as follows: 
'' 5. Th:Iindful that there is secured, to my said 
wife by the laws of Utah, one-third ofmyreal es-
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tate in said State, if she survive me as my lawful 
wife, and that she will receive such one-third by 
the operations of the law and not under the terms 
of this will, I therefore make no provision in her 
favor respecting said one-third being conducted 
with the provisions of the State of Utah in her 
behalf and willing that she receive said one-third 
by the operation of law and not under the terms 
of this Will. The other and remaining two-thirds 
of my real estate in the said State of Utah, I give, 
devise and bequeath to R. W. Madsen, Jr., and 
Francis A. :\fadsen, in equal shares." (R. 29) 
In a codicil, ~:Ir. Madsen reiterated the idea that his 
wife should receive one-third by operation of law, but 
in addition he gave to her expressly the entire owner-
ship of certain real estate at 6974 Holladay Boulevard. 
(R. 32, 33) 
The executor defended the action on the theory that 
there was no writing to satisfy the statute of frauds 
(U.C.A., 33-5-1), and no writing subscribed as required 
by 33-5-3 of the Utah Code Annotated, and that the 
action was barred by applicable statute of limitations 
(U.C.A., 104-2-5, 22(2), 23 and 30). nirs. Madsen denied 
several of the allegations of the complaint, set up the 
statute of frauds and the statute of limitations, and 
further in defense and as a counterclaim to the plaintiff, 
~irs. Madsen alleged that she received no consideration, 
and that if the Peterson contract was executed as alleged 
by the plaintiff, then she joined not with her husband but 
with a fiduciary for the plaintiff corporation, and that 
since neither she nor her husband received any considera-
tion for the Peterson contract, she had never contracted 
alll 
:ill 
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to convey her statutory share to the Petersons or anyone 
else. She alleged, moreover, that her husband owed a 
duty to her to disclose to her at the time of the execution 
of the Peterson contract the fact that he was acting as 
fiduciary for the corporation. She alleged that the cor-
poration kne'v she did not have notice of its interest and 
that it did not at any time give her any notice of its 
interest, and that the failure to disclose the interests 
and the relationships of the corporation to her husband 
constituted a fraud upon her. She asked the Court to 
require the corporation to account for one-third of all 
the sums received under the Peterson contract and one-
third of all sums to be paid thereunder. (R. 53-59) 
The Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to 
specific performance of the alleged contract with R. W. 
Madsen, and it entered its decree requiring his executor 
to execute its deed to plaintiff. ~[adsonia was held to 
be entitled to all moneys received and to be relieved 
under the Peterson contract, but its request for a decree 
against Mrs. :Madsen was refused. Mrs. Madsen was 
denied relief as against plaintiff, and her request that 
she be awarded dower in the seller's equity was also re-
fused. (R. 75-76, 90-91) 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT NO. I 
THE ACTION OF THE PLAINTIFF IS BARRED BY THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
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POINT NO. II 
PLAINTIFF PROVED NO COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
(a) There was no memorandum reduced to writing. 
(b) N10 writimg was subscribed by the parties to be 
charged as .required by Section 35-5-3, U.C.A., 1943. 
(c) Plaintiff proved insufficient part perforrJUllnce 
bo t·ake the case out of the St:atute of Frauds. 
POINT NO. III 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS SECOND CONCLUSION 
OF LAW, WHEREIN IT FOUND "THAT LaRETA C. MADSEN 
BY THE SIGNING OF SAID CONTRACT TO JAMES 0. 
PETERSON AND C. AMELIA PETERSON, RELEASED 
HER STATUTORY DOWER RIGHT AS PROVIDED BY SEC-
TION 101-4-3, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1943, AND SHE ~r 
HAS NO PRESENT INTEREST IN OR CLAIM UPON SAID 
CONTRACT." 
(a) Since urnder the theory of plaintiff and the trial 
court R. W. M·adsen executed the Peterson contract as 
trustee o'f pZa;intiff, the signature of Mrs. Madsen was in-
effectual'as a reletase of her ·mower as to any one, includ-
ing the Petersons, since a wife cannot release inchoate 
wowe.r unless joined by her husband. 
(b) Even if LaReta C. Madsen agreed to convey 
her dower rights to the Petersons, that fact does not 
enl.arg.e the rights .of plaintiff. 
(c) The seller under am executory contract of sale 
of re,al property ret:ains a ''legal or equitable .estate in 
.real property." Under our Statute the widow shares i:n 
in this interest. 
(d) The execution of a contract to sell kMui does not 
extinguish the seller's interest inl the land. 
POINT NO. IV 
THE SILENCE OF R. W. MADSEN, SR., AND THE 
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PLAINTIFF, AND THEIR FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THE 
ALLEGED INTEREST OF THE PLAINTIFF IN THE LAND 
AT THE TIME OF THE EXECUTION OF THE PETERSON 
CONTRACT, CONSTITUTED A FRAUD UPON MRS. MAD-
SEN. PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO ACCOUNT 
TO HER FOR ONE-THIRD OF THE TOTAL SALES PRICE, 
AND SUCH RELIEF TO HER SHOULD BE A CONDITION 
TO ANY RELIEF TO PLAINTIFF IN THIS ACTION. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
THE ACTION OF THE PLAINTIFF IS BARRED BY THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Secion 104-2-5 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1943, 
provides: 
"No action for the recovery of real property 
or for the possession thereof, shall be maintained 
unless it appears that the plaintiff, his ancestor, 
grantor or predecessor, was seized of the property 
in question within seven years before the com-
Inencement of the action.'' 
Section 104-2-22 ( 2) provides that ''an action upon 
any contract, obligation or liability founded upon an in-
strument in writing, except those mentioned in the pre-
ceding section" shall be brought within six years. 
Section 104-2-23 provides that '• an action upon a 
contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an 
instrument in writing * * * '' shall be brought wit~in fo~r 
years. 
Section 104-2-30: 
''An action for relief not otherwise provided 
for must be comn1erced within four years after the 
cause of action ~hall have accrued. '' 
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The Court erred in the case at bar in failing to find 
that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. 
In substance and effect the Court found that plaintiff and 
defendant R. W. Madsen, Sr., executed a contract for 
the conveyance of real property on or about the first day 
of ·January, 1937. Conceding for the purpose of argu-
rnent that the book entries relied upon by the plaintiff 
were sufficient to evidence the existence of the contract 
found by the Court and that the alleged contract is en-
forceable, it is nevertheless clear that the only c.ontract 
rnade at any time between R. W. Madsen, Sr., and plain-
tiff was made and completed on January 1, 1937. The 
Court found in substance that at all times subsequent to 
this date R. W. Madsen, Sr., was acting as the agent 
and fiduc.iary of the corporation in his dealings with this 
land. The only contract ever made between R. W. Madsen 
and plaintiff, if indeed there ever was a contract, was 
entered into on this date, and the obligation of R. W. 
Madsen to perform, according to the terms of the alleged 
contract, must date from this time. There is no other time 
from which the time for his performance can be meas-
ured. 
There can be no question that the statute of limita-
tions commenced to run against R. W. ~{adsen, Sr., as of 
January 1, 1937. Whether the applicable statute is seven 
years, six or four under the Utah law is not material, 
because the time has passed in any event. 
The findings of the Court are barren of any refer-
ence to the statute of limitations. The theory upon which 
Glltl 
itat 
lin 
lor 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
the Court denied the 1notion of the defendants based on 
the statute of limitations is not set out. The Court pur-
ports to enforce the contract between the plaintiff and 
defendant exeeuted January 1, E)~i7, but fails to indi'cate 
in any manner whether the statute was tolled in some 
respect or by son1e act of the parties or what other rea-
sons it nray have for enforcing the alleged agreement 
at this late date. Clearly the Court erred in failing to 
make findings of fact on this important issue. 
Plaintiff corporation is confronted with this di-
lemma: On the one hand, if it is attempting to enforce 
a contract entered into on January 1, 1937, this contract 
was executed by it entirely on that date and the perform-
ance of R. W. Madsen was due at that time, and the 
statute of limitations has long since run against its claim. 
On the other hand, if it is not attempting to enforce a 
contract entered into on this date, there are no findings 
and there is no evidence to support a judgment in its 
favor against the executor, because clearly no agreement 
was made between plaintiff and the deceased at any other 
time with respect to this particular piece of real property. 
Some argument during the course of the trial was 
directed to the idea that plaintiff was attempting to en-
force the terms of a trust. Because it is anticipated that 
plaintiff might make some argument about trust in its 
brief, we desire to lay a firebreak at this time as far as 
the statute of limitations question is concerned. The only 
way plaintiff can contend that there is a trust is b:v 
reason of the fact that R. W. l\iadsen did not perforn1 
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under the terms of the alleged contract. The use of 
"trust" language is misleading. There is no trust ex-
cept as it arises by operation of law. The only way the 
larw ·can operate is through the establishment of the con-
tract. The trust theory, therefore, is applicable only in 
the sense that under plaintiff's theory the deceased owed 
an obligation to plaintiff to execute a deed on January 
1, 1937, since deceased at that time had legal title to 
the property. Certainly Mr. Madsen was not a trustee 
in any sense except as he held the title. He had no actual 
duties as trustee. There was no trust agreement. If this 
is not an action to perform a contract, we challenge the 
plaintiff in its brief to tell the Court what the action is 
all about. If this is not plaintiff's theory it has certainly 
been successful in keeping its theory to itself during the 
entire trial and proceedings in this case. 
It is sub1nitted that the statute of lin1itations has run 
against plaintiff's claim, and hat it cannot successfully 
1naintain this action against the executor of R. W. Mad-
sen, Sr., or against his widow. 
POINT NO. II 
PLAINTIFF PROVED NO COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
(a) There was no memorandum reduced. to writing. 
Section 33-5-1 of the Utah Code requires that any 
contract for the conveyance of an interest in real prop-
erty must be reduced to writing. Under the facts of this 
case the writing relied upon by the plaintiff to comply 
with the statute of frauds is insufficient, both in that it 
ra: 
(il( 
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does not adequately describe the real property which 
was the subject of the alleged contract, and in that it 
does not disclose the tenus of the alleged contract. 
The evidence relied upon by the plaintiff is a boo~ 
entry in the books of :Jladsonia Realty Company, in 
the handwriting of R. ,V. :Madsen, Sr., as follows: 
·'NAME Real Estate - 667 East 1st .So. St. 
Date Items Fol. Debits 
Jan. 1, 1937 Ground 304 $4120.00 
Jan. 1, 1937 Building 304 6560.00" 
In connection with this entry there was introduced 
evidence of an entry in the account of R. W. :Madsen 
crediting him with the sum of $10,680.00 on January 1, 
1937. How many inferences can be drawn from these two 
book entries~ It is possible to assume that the $10,680.00 
was the first payment on the real property and that other 
payments were to he forthcoming. If that is the case, 
it is absolutely impossible to ascertain the other terms 
of the contract. Whether plaintiff was to pay the balance 
at a time certain or in monthly installments, or pay in-
terest, is certainly not apparent from these entries. It 
is possbile to assume that the amounts shown were to 
constitute the entire transaction, and that Mr. Madsen 
was obligated immediately to convey his interest in the 
property. It is impossible to know whether R. W. Madsen 
agreed to convey only his interest or his own plus an 
inchoate dower right of :Jirs. :Jiadsen. The terms of any 
agreement cannot be ascertained from these book entries. 
Any attempt to spell out the agreement results in hazard-
ous speculation and uncertainty. 
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The law is well settled that the entire terms of the 
bargain Inust be apparent fron1 the writing itself to 
satisfy the statute of frauds. 
''The general rule is that the memorandum, 
in order to satisfy the statute, Inust contain the es-
sential terms of the contract, expressed with such 
certainty that they may be understood from the 
memorandum itself or some other writing to 
which it refers or with which it is connected, with-
out resorting to parol evidence. A memorandum 
disclosing merely that a contract has been made, 
without showing what the contract is, is not suffi-
cient to satisfy the requirement of the statute of 
frauds that there be a memorandum in writing of 
the contract." 49 Am. J ur. 663, 664. 
The plaintiff could conceivably contend that these 
trwo book entries, in connection with the acts of the par-
ties, disclose the existence of a contract, and that the 
subsequent acts of the parties adequately define its terms. 
Such a statement would be inaccurate and extreme, but 
whether or not it is true is immaterial. The question is 
whether there is writing that satisfies the statute of 
frauds. That writing itself must contain the terms of 
the contract. The subsequent actions of the parties can-
not be relied upon to disclose its terms, but that writing 
itself must do the job. In the case at bar there is no writ-
ing that satisfies the statute. 
(b) No writing was su,bscribed by the parties to be 
charged as .required by Section 35-5-3, U.C.A., 1943. 
The Utah statute of frauds not only requires the 
mmnorandum referred to be in writing, but Section 33-
5-3 of the Utah Code requires that the writing be sub-
till 
tle 
:Iii 
ill! 
in: 
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scribed by the party to be changed. Under such circmn-
stanres it is held that the writing rnust be signed at the 
end th·ereof by the party. 
In Dacis v. Shields, (1841), 26 \Yend. (N.Y.) 341, 
reversing (1840) 24 \Vend. 322, a broker inserted the 
names of both :parties in n1emorandum, but neither of 
the parties nor the broker signed it. The Court held that 
because of the change in the language of the New York 
statute of frauds by substitution of the word ''sub-
scribed'' for ''signed,'' the n1emorandum was not suffi-
cient to satisfy the statute. 
In Jarnes v. Patten, (1851), 6 N.Y. 9, 55 Am. Dec. 
376, the defendants' names appeared in the b:ody of the 
memorandum which was in the handwriting of one of 
the defendants. The Court held that the statute requir-
ing that the memorandun1 be ''subscribed'' required that 
it be signed manually at the end of the agreement, and 
that the words ''signed'' and ''subscribed'' were not 
synonymous or equivalent. 
In McGivern v. Fleming, (1884), 12 Daly (N.Y.) 289, 
66 How. Pr. 300, the defendant's daughter at his direc-
tion signed a mernorandum near the middle, and the 
Court held that the memorandum was insufficient both 
as to terms before and after the signature. The Court 
held that the memorandum was not subscribed. To the 
same effect is Bisgeier v. Kellar (1934), 122 Misc. 705, 
203 N.Y. Sup. 797, where the defendant wrote his own 
name in the middle of the document. 
A lease of property for more than one year was re-
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quired to be subscribed and not merely signed in Three 
Hundred West Averi!Ue Corporation v. Warner (1929), 
250 N.Y. 221, 165 N. E. 271. 
The California statute requires a memorandum to 
be subscribed. In Re Clifford (1873, C.C.) 2 Sawy. 428, 
Fed. Case No. 2893, a federal court held that the printing 
of the name or the seller at the head of a written paper 
would not satisfy the statute. 
In the case at bar there is no writing signed by R. 
W. Madsen which evidences an intention to sell to the 
corporation. He did not sign any of the book entries and 
there can be no question that he did not subscribe any 
writing as far as the corporation is concerned. Oertainly 
the Court is not justified in concluding that there was 
evidence to satisfy Section 35-5-3 of our Code with refer-
ence to the purported transaction between R. W. :Jiadsen 
and 1\iadsonia. 
(c) pz,aintiff proved insufficient part. perfor'I'JW!nCe 
to t·ake the case out of the St·atute of Frauds. 
The Court made no Conclusion of Law to indicate 
whether it felt that the contract between Mr. Madsen and 
the corporation was satisfactory under the statute of 
frauds, or whether there was sufficient part performance 
to take the case out of the statute. Failure to make such 
finding is reversib}e error in itself. This is a vital point 
of law. The issue was directly raised by answer and mo-
tion by both defendants. The Court completely ignored 
the contentions in its Findings, Conclusions and Decree. 
Inasmuch as the partial perfor1nance idea was pre-
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sented in the course of the arg·ument, and it is not in1pos-
sible that the ·Court applied the doctrine in this case, 
it is believed that consideration of it as applied to the 
facts of this cas,e is worth while. 
The doctrine of part performance is only applicable 
in those situations where the actions of the party so point 
to the existence of a contract with respect to a particular 
piece of property which is the subject of that contract 
that there can be no doubt of its existence. So funda-
mental is this principle that no citation of authority is 
necessary. The contract itself must be so clear and un-
mistakable that its terms can be understood and the 
rights of the parties to it can be protected by the court. 
In the case at bar no such proof was adduced. Plain-
tiff produced no evidence whatsoever which in any way 
sheds any light on th~ question as to whether Mrs. 1\Iad-
sen 's inchoate dower interest in the property was to be 
sold by Mr. Madsen to the corporation under the terms 
of his alleged contract with it. There is no ~evidence that 
Mr. Madsen received any actual consideration from the 
corporation for his interest in the property. The n1ost 
the evidence can be said to disclose is that the books of 
the company show a credit of $10,680.00. 
Plaintiff presented the theory, and the trial court 
found, that the plaintiff paid the profits tax upon a profit' 
to the corporation of $9,428.41 showed some part per~ 
formance. This fact 0ertainly does not help plaintiff. 
In the first place, plaintiff apparently failed to take ad-
vantage of the installm~nt provision of the tax statutes. 
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It paid a tax based on an anticipated profit which it may 
or may not receive, depending upon fortuitous circum-
stances oVJer which it had no control. ·These circum-
stances include the future value of real estate, the pos-
sibility of derault by the buyers on the contract and the 
collectibility of any judgment against the buyers. In the 
second place, it is purely a self-serving, hearsay kind of 
action. Even if it has some effect as an admission by 
R. W. M:adsen and the interest he owned, it certainly 
does not constitute an admission against the interests 
of his wife or enlarge the corporation's claim to these 
rights. 
Attention is invited to the fact that the decree of the 
Court has the effect of giving plaintiff the benefit of 
the conveyance of the interest of Mrs. ~Iadsen to the 
Petersons, even though there is no evidence of any con-
tract whatsoever between ~Irs. Madsen and the corpora-
tion. It must be admitted by all parties that no evidence 
was produced con0erning any ag.reement of any kinrl 
between :Mrs. :Madsen and 1Iadsonia. The Court, in fact, 
refuses to enforce such a contract and says that the 
corporation cannot obtain specific performance against 
her. Despite this holding, the Court directs, in effect, 
the Petersons to pay to the corporation all sums which 
they agreed to pay to Mr. and Mrs. Madsen. Certainly 
under any theory of the case thel"e is no evidence whatso-
ever of any agreement or part performance by Mrs. Mad-
sen that justifies this conclusion. 
POINT NO. III 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS SECOND CONCLUSION 
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OF LAW, WHEREIN IT FOUND "THAT LaRETA C. MADSEN 
BY THE SIGNING OF SAID CONTRACT TO JAMES 0. 
PETERSON AND C. AMELIA PETERSON, RELEASED 
HER STATUTORY DOWER RIGHT AS PROVIDED BY SE'C-
TION 101-4-3, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1943, AND SHE 
HAS NO PRESENT INTEREST IN OR CLAIM UPON SAID 
CONTRACT." 
(a) Since wnder the theory of plaintiff and the trial 
court R. W. Llla.dsen executed the Peterson :contr,act as 
trustee of plai.ntiff, the S'ignat>Ure of JJ!l rs. JJ!l ads en was in-
effectual as a release of her ·dJower as t-o any one, indud-
ing the Petersons, since a wife cannot release inchoate 
dowe.r un~ess joined by her husband. 
The Court decided that ~Iadsonia was not entitled 
to any relief against LaReta C. Madsen (R. 75; Con-
clusions of Law Nos. 2, 4, 5 and 6), but the Court indi-
cated in Conclusions of Laws Nos. 2 and 3 that Mrs. Mad-
sen has no interest whatsoever in this property. (R. 75) 
It is clear the Court finds that Richard W. Madsen signed 
the Peters·on contract as a fiduciary of plaintiff corpora-
tion. The plaintiff in fact alleges in its petition that 
the Peterson sale "·was in fact made by l\tfadsonia 
Realty Company,'' and in substance that Richard W. 
Madsen ,executed the deed as trustee of the corporation. 
The Court adopted this theory in the following lan-
guage: ''that said Richard W. l\fadsen was in fact acting 
for and on behalf of l\1adsonia Realty Company in the 
signing of said con tract of sale." (Finding of Fact No. 
6; R. 72) The situation therefore is that the Peterson 
contract was executed by R. W. :Madsen as trustee of 
plaintiff and by :Mrs. LaReta C. :Madsen personally .. It is 
a situation where l\1rs. :Madsen, as the wife of the de-
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ceased, joined with plaintiff corporation in the execution 
of a contract of sale. No consideration of any kind went 
either to Mrs. Madsen or her husband. 
The law is setHed that unless a woman receives con-
sideration she cannot release or convey her inchoate 
dower interest in land. It is to be noted that at the time 
of the execution of the Peterson contract, under the 
theory of the plaintiff and trial court the bare legal title 
to the property was in Mr. Madsen; the equitable bene-
icial interest was in the plaintiff corporation, and both 
of these interests were subject to the inchoate dower 
right of l\Irs. Madsen. The trial court held that the sig-
nature of Mr. Madsen was in fact that of the corporation, 
and that the corporation's interest was subject to the con-
tract. The question, therefore, is whether a married 
woman who receives no consideration can, by joining with 
a third person, convey her interest. 
There is no question but that a marri,ed woman has 
only a contingent inchoate interest in the land owned 
by her husband. The cases repeatedly have held that 
she has nothing to convey or sell except as an incident 
to a conveyance by her husband. Therefore, if the deed is 
not with the husband 'and joined by him, or if the deed 
of the husband is set aside or annuHed or disregarded 
for any reason, and the conveyance is held ineffective as 
to his interest, it is also ineffective as to the interest of 
his wife ·and her inchoate dower is restored. 
Scribner in his work on Dower states the law as 
follows (2nd Ed., Vol. 2, Page 313, beginning at Sec-
tion 49): 
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• 'A wife who joins with her husband is a con-
veyance of his lands, is not a party thereto, except 
for the purpose of relinquishing her dower. She 
is not to be regarded as alienating a real subsist-
ing estate, but as releasing a future contingent 
right. Her renuciation of dower is to attend the 
conveyance of her husband; to enduDe while that 
endures, and no longer. Hence if the conveyance 
of the husband be inoperative, or if it be set aside, 
or avoided, the right of dower remains unim-
paired. 
''50. It is upon this principal that dower is 
restored where a conveyance in which the wife has 
joined, is set aside as fraudulent as to the credi-
tors of the husband, and in a case where lands 
were sold on execution, and before the expiration 
of the time for redemption, the judgment debtor 
and his wife executed a mortgage upon the same 
lands, but the premis,es were not redeemed, and 
the purchaser received a sheriff's deed, it was 
decided that the right of dower was not barred by 
the ·execution of the mortgage, because the subse-
quent mortgage was extinguished by the failure 
to redeem from the prior sale. So where the wife 
relinquished her dower by joining her husband in 
a deed containing the usual covenants; and the 
grantee afterwards recovered judgment and sa tis~ 
faction against the husband for an alleged breach 
of his covenants 'that he was lawfully seized and 
had good right to conve)~'; it was held that such 
deed could not be made use of to bar· the wife from 
her dower in the land. 'The estate,' the court said, 
'did not pass from Parsons to Hinckley, . as ap-, 
pears from his own allegations and proceedings; 
and the relinquishment of dower by the wi£e can-
not now avail, since there is no estate for it to 
operate on. ' So where a widow was administni-:-
trix of her husband's estate, surrendered her 
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dower in part satisfaction of a claim asserted 
against the estate, and the settlement was after-
wards set aside at the instance of the creditor, it 
was held that the right to dower was thereby 
reviVted. '' 
In Robinson v. Bates, 3lvt:et. (Mass. 1841) a husband 
and wife joined in a deed whereby she releas•ed her dower. 
A creditor of the husband subsequently levied on the 
land during the life of the husband and recovered the 
land in an action against the grantee of the deed in 
which the wife and husband joined, the creditor's theory 
was that the deed of the husband and wife was in fraud 
of creditors. The wife thereupon, after the death of the 
husband, sued for her dower right in the land and the 
judgrnent creditor objected on the ground that she re-
leas•ed her interest in the deed. The Court said: 
"In Stinson v. Sumner, 9 Mass. 143, it was 
decided that where a wife releases her claim of 
dower by joining her husband in a conveyance 
and the purchaser recovers back the purchase 
money on account of the grantor's defect of title 
to the land, the release of the wife the·reby be-
com•es inoperative and does not bar her right of 
dower after her husband's decease. The principal 
upon which that decision is founded applies con-
clusively to the present case. The tenant has 
avoided the deed of the husband and defeated the 
estate on which the demandment to release the 
dower was intended to operate. By law, therefore, 
and in justi0e she was thereby restored to her for-
mer rights.'' 
Tiffany in his work on Real Property, 3rd Ed., Vol. 
2, Page 384, Sec. 512, thus states the law: 
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··In con1n1on law the wido·w could, after the 
husband's death, release her dower right, but the 
wife of a living husband has no such right. The 
only mode in which a married won1an -can convey 
or extinguish any interest belonging to her being 
by joinder with her husband in a fine or re-
covery. There are som·e states statutes author-
izing the release by the wife of her inchoate dower 
and her right to release it by joining in her hus-
band's conveyance generally recognized. 
''A release by the wife is usually ineffectiv~e 
unless the husband joins therein, sometimes by 
express provisions of statute, sometimes by rea-
son of the general rule that a married woman 
cannot dispose of interest in land without the join-
der of her husband. And the fact that the re-
lease is made to one to whom the husband has 
previously conveyed the land does not dispense 
with the necessity of joinder. If the widow mar-
ries again, her second husband must join in her 
release of dower rights in her first husband's 
land.'' 
The principal is again recognized and applied in 
French v. Peters, 33 Maine 396. There the hushand 
executed a mortgage on January 19, 1829. The wife did 
not join with her husband but by a separate conveyance 
written upon the back of the mortgag~e purported to 
convey to the same mortgage on February 4, 1829. She 
recited that this is "done by the consent of my said hus-
band, testified by his being a party thereto,'' ·but the 
husband was not a party to her ~onveyance. She received 
no consideration except the sum of $12,000.00 which had 
been paid previously to her husband. The Court held 
that she encumbered no interest that had in the. land. 
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She could not convey anything except as an incident to 
the conv·eyance of her husband. Since the husband had 
previously conveyed but he did not join in her convey-
ance, her supposed deed had no legal force or effect. The 
wife recovered her dower inter·est in the land. 
And in Fu.lk v. Robinson, 140 Ark. 12, 215 S. W. 
67 4, the Court stated the question to be: ''Whether ·or not 
a wife can convey her inchoate right of dower and home-
stead to a stranger by executing a deed in which her 
husband does not join.'' The Court answered in the 
negative. 
In P·age v. Page, 6 Cushings Rep. 196 (Mass.), sub-
sequently to the execution of a deed by her husband a 
1narried woman executed a document which purported 
to relinquish her dower in the land previously conveyed. 
Held, since the wife did not join with her husband in a 
deed or sale of the premises, her dower rights were not 
barr·ed. 
The principle is also recognized and applied in a 
number of Federal cases. See In Re Lingafelter, 104 C. 
C.A. 38, 181 Fed. 24, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 108; Wilson v. 
Robins•on, et al. (C.C.A. 2, 1936), 83 F. (2d) 397, and 
cas·es and authorities cited. 
In the case at bar the effect of the decree of the 
court and the effect of plaintiff's theory is substantially 
the same as though plaintiff was a creditor seeking to 
set aside the fraudulent conveyance. The plaintiff seeks 
to obtain the benefits of the contract executed by R. W. 
~fads·en. The Court in effect permits it to obtain those 
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sen's interest at the tiine of his death to the plaintiff. 
Stated in another way, plaintiff says in effect: ''Before 
:Mr. and .Mr~. j[adsen executed the Peterson contract 
:Mrs. Madsen had an interest in the property. It is true 
that that interest is subject to measurement and evalua-
tion and it has a nwnetary value. To that interest we 
have no clain1. After the Peterson contract, Mrs. Mad-
sen has no interest because she had agreed to sell it to the 
Petersons. Not only now do we claim the interest Mr. 
Madsen had, but we also have a right to her inter,est." 
This kind of logic is absolutely unsound and un-
tenable. If l\Irs. l\Iadsen had an interest in the property 
before she signed the Peterson contract, how can the 
Court hold that all of the money under the contract 
should go to the plaintiff and that she is entitled to re-
ceive no part of it, despite the fact that the Court holds 
there is no obligation from her to the corporation to con-
vey her interest to it 1 
Since the plaintiff claims the interest of R. W. 
Madsen. 
Madsen and in effect claims his interest in the Peterson 
contract, it is inconsistent for the Court to hold that jl rs. 
Madsen "has no interest in and is not entitled to an 
accounting for any ·of the money received by ~Iadsonia 
Realty Company as paJinent for James 0. Peterson 
and C. Amelia Peterson, his wife, or which shall here-
after be paid by said buyers, and LaReta C. Madsen is 
not entitled to an accounting by Zion's Savings Bank 
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& Trust Company, as executor of said estate, on account 
of any moneys paid or owing by the purchasers of said 
property.'' 
It is to be noted that the Petersons are not parties 
to this lawsuit and are not bound by the decree. Never-
theless, they are certainly interested parties in the sense 
that the findings of the Court may indicate to them to 
whom the payments should be made in the future. The 
Court went further than it needed to go in finding in 
effect that Mrs. Madsen was to receive no part of the 
Peterson paYJnent, but whether it unduly extended itself 
or not, it is clear that the theory upon which the Court 
made this decision was manifestly erroneous. 
It is submitted that the Court should have found 
in conformity with the proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law of the defendant LaReta C. Madsen 
to the effect that she retains the property interest in this 
land. (See R. 87, 88 ; Proposed Findings of Fa·ct Nos. 
8, 9, 10 and 11, and proposed Conclusions of Law Nos. 
2, 3, 5 and 5.) 
(b) Even if LaReta C. Madsen agreed to convey 
her dower rights to the Peter sons, that fact does not 
enlarge the rights of pba.intiff. 
The point cannot be rnade too often that the decree 
of the Court has the eff.ect of giving to the plaintiff 
more rights than it had before the execution of the 
Peterson contract. }fadsonia itself takes the position 
that although it did not have the right to benefit from 
a conveyance of ~Irs. :Madsen's inchoate dower interest 
1\ i 
t 
··.··i·j 
i' I 
•)·, 
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before the execution of the Peterson contrac-t, it should 
now ree.eiYe all of the benefits, and the Court found in 
effect that the Petersons should pay all of the balance 
due to the corporation. 
Even asstuning for the purpose of argument only 
that :Jirs. :Jiadsen joined with her husband in the Peter-
son contract as a fiduciary of the plaintiff corporation, 
as it did under the Court's theory, the law is clear that 
such joinder would not help the plaintiff. If an owner 
of land deeds to A in a deed not joined by his wife, and 
subsequently conveys to B, his wife joining, the wife's 
release as to B is ineffective in an action by A to recover 
the land. A 1nay recover but he does so subject to the 
dower interest of the wife. 
At Page 307 of V olun1e II, Scribner (on Dower) 
states the law as follows : 
"Release to Stranger. N.o Bar of Dower. 
'' 40. It is well settled that it is no defense to 
an action of dower, that the widow has released 
her right to a stranger. In an early case in -:\[as-
sachusetts in which the defense was that the de-
fendant had ·executed a release to a third person, 
the court said : 'The deed relied on to bar the 
demandant shows no privity of estate, or con-
nection of any kind between her and the tenant. 
It cannot avail the t·enant in this action.' (Citing 
Pixley v. Bennett, 11 :Mass. 298) 
'' 41. In a case where lands had been mort-
gaged by the husband during coverture, his wife 
not joining; and subsequently husband and wife 
united in a conveyance of the equity ·of redemp-
tion to a third :person; and after breach of the 
mortgage there was a foreclosure and sale; it 
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was held, that the widow was entitled to dower 
as against a purchaser under the decree not con-
necting himself in any manner with conveyance 
of the equity. (Citing Littl·efield v. Crocker, 30 
Maine 1926). So where husband and wife after 
the recovery of a judgment against the husband, 
and while it was a lien upon his lands, joined in 
a conveyance containing full covenants of war-
ranty and rel·ease of dower, and the grantee 
entered and occupied under the deed but was 
afterwards evicted by a purchaser at sheriff's 
sale under the judgment, it was held that the latter 
could not make the conveyance and release avail-
able for his protection against the claim of dower, 
either as a grant, or as an estoppel. (Citing 
Kitzmiller v. Van Rensselaer, 10 Ohio St. 63). 
So where lands had been mortgaged to secure 
the payment of a debt, both having joined in the 
mortgage, subsequently the lands were sold under 
a judgment against the husband, at the suit of a 
stranger to the mortgage, it was determined that 
as against the purchaser at such sale a wife was 
not divested of her dower. (Citing Taylor v. 
Fowler, 18 Ohio 567). The result will be the same 
if the mortgagee proceed at law and sell the 
mortgaged premises under ordinary judgment and 
execution, instead of foreclosing his mortgage. 
The purchaser under such a judgment cannot be 
said to he in privity with the mortgagee and there-
fore is not protected against dower. (Citing Har-
rison v. Eldridge, 2 Haist. 392). 
"Upon the same principle, if husband and 
wife execute a deed of trust, and the lands are 
afterward sold in satisfaction of a mechanics lien 
subsisting at the date of the deed, the purchaser 
takes the premises subject to dower. (Citing Gove 
v. Cather, 23 III. 634)." 
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Plaintiff cannot and does not deny that it claims no 
privity with the Petersons. ~[adsonia n1akes no claim 
whatsoever against the Petersons in this lawsuit; in fact, 
its own E>vidence amply denwnstrated that Petersons 
had a contract with ~[r. and Mrs. l\Jladsen and did not 
know of any interest of the plaintiff in the land until 
after R. \Y. ~Iadsen's death. The theory of the plain-
tiff's suit is that it should stand in the place of R. W. 
~fadsen; in fact, as an alternative ground for relief 
plaintiff prays "that the interest of Zion's Savings 
Bank and Trust Company, as Executor of the Estate 
of R. W. ~Iadsen, deceased, and the interest of LaReta 
C. Madsen be declared to be subsequent and subordinate 
to l\fadsonia Realty Company. :K• * * '' In other words, 
plaintiff asserts the same right that a defrauded creditor 
might assert if such a creditor elected to stand upon the 
contract of sale and take its benefits. The Court agreed 
with plaintiff and held that the plaintiff was entitled 
to receive the interest of R. W. :Madsen. The point is 
that the privity claimed by plaintiff is with R. vV. 
Madsen and the right claimed is based upon an alleged 
agreement to sell to plaintiff prior to the Peterson con-
tract. 
The foregoing discussion by Scribner, and the cases 
which follow in this brief, therefore, are precisely in 
point. In each case, as in the case at bar, the person 
claiming that the wido'v released her dower is one who 
asserts a right prior and senior to the instrument which 
the wife. executed. The cases are uniform in holding 
that the purported release is not effective, and that upon 
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the estabtishm·ent of the prior right, the dower right is 
restored. 
In Pixley v. Bennett, 11 !fass. 298, a widow brought 
writ of dower demanding that reasonable dower in 
certain lands situate in the county concerned be awarded 
to her. The defendant answered that the widow had for 
a valuable consideration released and quitclaimed her 
demand or account of dower to one Caleb and that this 
release was an ineffectual bar to her claim for dower 
in any of her husband's land. The defendant's theory 
was that having once released her claim she was estop-
ped. The Court held : 
''The deed relied on to har the demandant 
shows no privity of estate, or connection of any 
kind between her and the tenant. It cannot avail 
the tenant in this action. Littlefield v. Crocker, 
30 Maine 192. Arin C. Littlefield, the husband 
of the plaintiff, mortgaged certain land to one 
Aurin; the wife of Littlefield did not join in this 
deed. Subsequently, Littlefield and his wife joined 
in a deed conveying the property to one Morrill. 
The wife released her dower in the deed to Mor-
rill. The mortgagee subsequently foredosed and 
the present defendant is the assignee of the title 
obtained through the sheriff's deed. The defen-
dant claimed that the plaintiff's release as to 
Morrill barred her. The court held that defen-
dant's contention was unsound, that no release 
to Morrill affected defendant's title. Since the 
defendant was not a privy or party to the plain-
tiff's conveyance, plaintiff was not estopped from 
obtaining dower on land.'' 
Kitzmillerr v. V am Rensselaer, 10 Ohio St. 63, was an 
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action to recover dower. The husband and the wife 
owned the land at a time when one R got a judgment 
against the husband. Mter the judgment was obtained 
and while it was a lien, before any execution, the wife 
joined ·with the husband in a deed containing a release 
of dower to the defendant, X, "~ho went in possession. 
Subsequently there was a judgment execution and X was 
evicted by the title of the judgment holder. The court 
held that the release of dower to X was not availing 
for the defendant judgment creditor and that it was no 
protection against the claim of dower either as a grant 
and estoppel, or otherwise. The widow was assigned 
dower in the land. This e-ase is clearly in point with 
the case at bar. 
The principle of these cases has been recognized 
at least twice by the Utah Supreme Court. In the case 
of Gee, et al. v. Bau.m, et al., 58 Utah 445, 199 P. 680, 
a husband and wife executed a deed to the children and 
grandchildren. The conflict in the evidence was as to 
whether the husband delivered the deed. The court held 
after reviewing the evidence that there was no delivery 
and no intent to deliver and it was, therefore, necessary 
for the court to decide whether the fact that the wife had 
joined in signing this instrument, \Vhich was held not 
to be effective as to the husband, was nevertheless a 
waiver of her inchoate dower in the land. The court 
said ( 452 Utah Reporter): 
''The overwhelming weight of authority is to 
the effect that if the wife joins in a deed with 
her husband to release her dower right and the 
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husband's deed is set aside for· any reason, then 
the. wife has· the same rights in the land that were 
attempted to be conveyed by the husband as 
though the conveyance had not been made.'' 
The court quotes with approval Section 49 of Scrib-
ner on Dower hereinbefore quoted. The Court then 
states: 
''A moment's reflection will, we think, con-
vince anyone that the foregoing doctrine is en-
tirely sound * * * We are of the opinion, there-
fore, that when the deed of the husband in which 
the wife joins, his wife merely is held inoperative 
as against him, it .also becomes inoperative as 
ag1ainst her, and that the grantee in such a deed 
obtains no rights whatever as against the wife." 
The second Utah case in which the principle was 
expressly recognized was In Re Reynolds Est.ate, 62 P. 
(2d) 270, 90 Utah 415. There it was held that the fact 
that a wife joins in a mortgage does not release her 
dowable interest as to heirs, personal creditors or taxes 
in the estate. The only person who could take advantage 
of the release was the mortgagee himself. 
Plaintiff may contend that it does not seek to set 
aside the Peterson contract. As to the Petersons that 
is true. Certainly plaintiff does assert that it is entitled 
to the ip.terest of R. W. Madsen in this contract. R. \V. 
M·adsen's deal with the corporation was subject to the 
inchoate dower· interest of his wife, and while the Court 
does not· grant specific performance to the plaintiff 
against Mrs. Madsen, the effect of its decision is to cut 
out her interest, because in eff·ect it holds that the Peter-
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sons must continue to pay the su1ns due under the con-
tract to the plaintiff, and that ~Irs. Madsen must convey 
to the Petersons her interest by a deed when the terms 
of the contract have been fully executed. Certainly this 
holding operates to give to plaintiff more rights than it 
had in any proper theory of the case. 
The contention of the plaintiff has been determined 
adversely to it. In the case of Froee v. Little, et al. 
(1907), 31 Utah -1:49, 88 Pac. 407, the plaintiff alleged 
that he had· had a contract as a buyer for the convey-
ance of certain real property by a man who was deceased 
at the time the action was brought. The wife made no 
agreement w convey her inchoate interest, and the pur-
chaser knew that the seller was married at the time the 
contract was entered into. The probate proceeding had 
been completed at the time the action was brought but 
the c(, urt held that the defendants' stood in the position 
of th'= deceased's husband, and also because of the 
peculi ... r circumstances involved, in the position of the 
wife. The principles announced were exactly the same 
as th'- ugh the action was brought against the executor 
and tl.e wife, as in the case at bar, for specific perform-
ance. This court expressly held that the action did not 
lie. 1 .. decided that specific performance could not have 
he-en obtained against the wife. Therefore, after the 
decea.;e of the husband the action could not be main-
tained against the executor of his estate or persons 
standing in the shoes of the executor. The following 
language is illuminating. 
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''Could it be contended that, when the hus-
band sold or conveyed lands without the consent 
of his wife, and the wife had afterwards claimed 
her interest and received it, the vendee of the 
husband could claim specific performance of the 
entire land against either the grantee or the donee· 
of the wife~ Moreover, oould any one re1asonably 
contend that such grantee could . not set up the 
defense tha.t the husband simply attempted to 
sell what he oould not sell, arnd that such grantee 
or donee claimed from the trtrre owner of the fee, 
the wife? Would not an exchange of property 
stand in the same legal position~ These children, 
therefore, in legal effect, simply effected an ex-
change with their mother, and we think they had 
the legal right to interpose any defense to pro-
tect their title that the mother might have inter-
posed, and could at least assert that the grantor, 
their father, had no right or title either to sell 
or convey. W·e think, therefore, that both upon 
principle and reason the appellants had the right 
to make the defense that they claimed in the right 
of their mother, that the father could not sell or 
convey her right without her consent, and that, 
therefore, the respondent could not and did not 
purchase the mothe·r's interest. While the auth-
orities are not in harmony respecting the right 
of. specific perf.ormance where the husband alone 
agreed to sell or convey without the consent of 
the wife, we think there is no subst:antial conflict 
where, as· in this oase, it a!ppears that the p·u.r-
chaser ~at the time the contrract was ern;tered into 
knew that the vendor W!as a ma.rried man, and 
whe·re the.re is neither fraud, misrepresentation, 
nor concealment. 
"To enact a law giving the wife an interest 
in the husband's real estaJte which he can neither 
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barter, sell, or convey without her consent, would 
be but an idle ceremony if the courts compelled 
specific performance against either the wife or 
those claiming under her or against the husband 
if living. The purchaser buys with full knowledge 
of both the interest as fixed by law and of his 
vendor's legal status. The purchaser knows he 
cannot obtain the interest of the wife without 
her consent, and that such interest is contingent 
only during the life of the husband, and that, 
upon his death, it immediately vests in the wife 
as a fee simple e·state. This court in the case 
of Kelsy v. Crowther, 7 Utah, 519-522, 27 Pac. 
695, recognizes the principle involved here, and 
it is there held that specific performance will not 
release her dower interest. Pomeroy, in his excel-
lent work on Equity Jurisprudence (3d Ed.) vol. 
7, Sec. 834 speaking upon this subject, says:' The 
buyer's right to specific performance with com-
pensation is subject to certain limittatiorvs; as, 
when it conflicts u:ith the intervening rights of 
third parties, an instan:ce of which i.s the case of 
the right of the wife to be protected, in her dower 
int.e;rest. Where the wife of the vendor refuses 
to conveY her inchoate dower interest in the 
land whi~h the vendor has contracted to sell, 
equity, in 1nany jurisdictions, denies specific per-
fonnance with con1pensation against the vendor 
for the deficiency, viz., the dower inte-rest, on the 
ground that compulsion upon the husband would 
tend to cause him to procure his wife's convey-
ance of dower against her will. For that reason 
the buyer mu.st be satisfied to take less than he 
conf.racted for by the amount of the dower interest, 
or abandon the contract.' In a note to the case 
Barbour v. Hickey, 24 L.R.A. 763, the cases upon 
this point are collected. See, also, Pomeroy on 
Spec. Perf. (2d Ed.) Sec. 461; Hawralty v. "\Var-
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ren, 18 N.J. Eq. 124, 90 Am. Dec. 613; Lucas v. 
Scott, 41 Ohio St. 636; Graybill v. Brugh (Va.) 
17 S.E. 558, 21 L.R.A. 133, 37 Am. St. Rep. 894. 
We think the correct rule is well stated in the case 
of Hawralty v. Warren, supra, where, at page 
128, it is said: 'The court will not order a defen-
dant to procure a conveyance or release by his 
wife, or require him to furnish indemnity against 
her right of dower, unless in cases of clear fraud.' 
It is perfectly clear from the evidence in this 
case that both respondent and her agent, her 
husband, well knew that the deceased was a 
married man; and hence, in view of the law of 
this state, could· not affe0t the rights of his wife 
by an attempted sale without her consent. There 
is absolutely no fraud, no collusion, and no con-
cealment in this case, and therefore no equity in 
favor of the respondent as against the children 
apart from the legal rights flowing from the con-
tract itself, and this respondent is conclusively 
presumed to have accepted burdened with the 
provisions of law in respect thereto. In view of 
the law ,as stated in the foregoing authorities, 
it is quite cle~ar that a;n action for specific per-
formance of the writing iw question 1against James 
T. Little, if alive, could wat be enforced, and the 
right to do so against the appeUants is certainly 
no stronger in equity than U would be against 
him." (Emphasis supplied). 
The law in this State is therefore that plaintiff's 
action cannot be maintained against the executor even 
though a contract is proved and there are no other bar-
riers to recovery. Certainly the Utah cases announce 
the rule that the interests of Mrs. Madsen cannot be 
taken from ·her, under the circumstanc-es of this case, 
by Madsonia Realty Company. 
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What equities does the plaintiff claim even as 
against the interests of Mr. Madsen 1 A fortiori, what 
equities can plaintiff claim against Mrs. :Madsen to 
justify a dec.ree which effectively cuts her out of any 
interest in this land f Certainly there is no justification 
for :Jiadsonia 's position that it obtained rights as a 
result of the Peterson contract, which it did not have 
by reason of the alleged transaction between it and Mr. 
:Madsen. 
(c) The seller under an execu.tory contract of sale 
of rea.l pr-operty retains a ''legal or equitable est,ate in 
real property.'' Under our statute the wimow shares in 
this interest. 
It is immaterial whether at common law a seller's 
interest in an executory real estate contract was dow-
able. A wife at common la'\v had no dower in an equi-
table interest. The requirements of the dowable estate 
were seizin, an estate of freehold and, of course, the 
death of the husband. Under Utah's distributive share 
statute, however (Section 101-4-3, U.C.A. 1943), not only 
does the widow obtain an interest in the "lands of free-
hold interest of which the husband dies seized,'' but 
she obtains a one-third interest in all the legal and equi-
table estates in real property. The seller under an ex-
ecutory contract does not have seizen and he does not 
have the entire fee interest but certainly he does have 
an equitable interest in the land. He owns an interest in 
real property. 
In this very action plaintiff is granted a form of 
relief peculiar to real property. It was granted specific 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
38 
perfonnance of a 1937 contract with R. W. :Madsen. It 
asked in the alternative for a decree quieting title to the 
land. If the seller under an executory contract for the 
sale of land has no legal or ·equitable interest in the 
land, the plaintiff cannot prevail against anybody on 
any theo·ry in this case, because the only interests that 
it can asser't to a claim are those which R. W. Madsen 
possessed as such a seller. 
We agree that R. W. Madsen had in interest in real 
property at the time of his death and that if the plaintiff 
satisfies the other requirements involved it n1ay maintain 
its action for specific performance. This being true, the 
Court erred in holding that Mrs. Madsen is not entitled 
to receive t least a one-third interest in the balance due 
under the contract at the time of R. W. Madsen's death. 
Under any theory of the case this is the very least that 
she is entitled to receive. 
The seller in an executory land contract has an 
interest that is sufficient to enable him to maintain an 
action to quiet title or to remove a cloud on title. Kern 
v. Ro:bertso'fl), 92 Mont. 283, 12 P. (2d) 565. He has an 
interest that can be levied upon as real property, as is 
shown by the following oases: 
In Bauermeister v. McDonald, 245 N.W. 403, X 
was the seller of land under an executory contract and 
$12,000 remained to be paid at the time of his death. 
In his will X devised certarn interests in the contract 
to his sonY. Z was a judgment-creditor of Y who levied 
an execution on ''all interest in the land'' that Y owned. 
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A lower court enjoined the sale of Y's interest on the 
theory that it was only equitable and not subj,ect to a 
writ of execution. On appeal, the trial court was re-
versed. The court said that X held the legal title to the 
real estate ''as security for the payment of the balance 
of tl1e purchase price.'' The court said that unquestion-
ably any judg1nent that might have been recovered 
against X in his lifetime would have been a lien upon 
the real estate to the extent of the unpaid purchase 
price fron1 the buyer. The court cites the case of When 
v. Fall, 55 Neb. 547, 76 N.W. 13, 70 Am. St. Rep. 397, 
among other Nebraska cases, and quotes: 
''A judgment in the district court against 
a vendor of land who retains the legal title acts 
as a lien to such land and as against a vendee in 
pos·session with actual notice may be enforced 
to the extent of the unpaid purchase price. 
"Until the purchase price has been paid, 
while the vendor holds the legal title subject to 
an equitable obligation to convey to the pur-
chaser on payment of the purchase money, he 
has, unlike an ordinar)~ trustee, a personal and 
substantial interest which he may actively assert, 
or may transfer by written assignment." See 
Tiffany on Real Property, 3rd Ed., Vol. 1, 8ec. 
308. 
These authorities are clear that a seller under a 
title retaining contract does have a real property in-
terest. 
Tiffany on Real Property, 3rd Ed., Vol. 1, Sec. 308, 
states: 
''The statement that the vendor holds the 
legal title in trust for the purchaser, is to be 
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taken, it seems, with considerable reserve . 
. " 'That the contract is not. a trust and does 
not create a fiduciary relation is the view taken 
in the Restatement, Trusts, Sec. 13. That the 
vendor is not properly referred to as_ a trustee 
see article by Professor Samuel Williston, 9 
Harv. Law Rev. at p. 117, quoting Rayner v. 
Preston, 18 Ch. D. 1. See also 15 Colum. Law 
Rev. at p. 256, 36 Sol. Jour. 775, 784; Bogert, 
Trusts & Trustees, Sec. 18.' ( ftn. 22). 
"He is trustee only to the extent of his obli-
gation to perform the agreement between him-
self and the purchaser. 
''A fiduciary relation does not exist between 
them. Englestein v. Mintz, 345 Ill. 48, 177 N.E. 
746. 
'' 'All that is meant is that the vendee, be-
cause of the nature of the bargain, or the unpaid 
vendor, because the right should be mutual, may 
compel specific performance. Before perform-
ance is thus compelled, it is manifest that the 
vendor holds the legal title subject to this equi-
table right of the vendee to compel a .conveyance, 
and that there is also an as yet unexercised right 
in the vendor to compel the vendee to accept and 
pay for the property. Hence, until specific per-
formance, the vendee is regarded as the equitable 
owner, and the risk of loss is upon him; and the 
vendor holds the legal title subject to the vendee's 
equitable rights which are analogous to the rights 
:O.f a cestui que trust only in that a conveyance 
· may be compelled, and, possibly, in that the 
vendee is entitled. to increment in value, rents 
and profits, etc., if and when performance is had. 
So also with the statement that a contracting 
vendor of real estate holds the legal title' 'a8 
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security for the payment of the purchase price.' ' 
This means, and was intended to Inean, no more 
than that, while the vendee has a right to compel 
specific performance, the vendor will not be re-
quired to convey unless and until the purchase 
price be paid.' National Bank of Kentucky v. 
Louisville Trust Co., 67 F. (2d) 97.'" (ftn. 23). 
''Until the price has been paid, while the 
vendor holds the legal title subject to an equitable 
obligation to convey to the purchaser on pay-
ments of the purchase money, he has, unlike an 
ordinary trustee, a personal and substantial inter-
est, which he may actively assert, or may transfer 
by written assignment. '' 
'' 'Shaw v. Foster, L.R. 5 H.L. 321, per Lord 
Cairns. See Pennsylvania Oo. for Insurance on 
Lives and Granting .Annuities v. Philadelphia 
Inquirer Co., 25 F. (2d) 701; Berndt v. Lusher, 
40 Ohio .App. 172, 178 N.E. 14.' (ftn. 24). 
'' 'Culm back v. Stevens, 158 Wash. 657, 291 
Pac. 705, holding that such an assignment is good 
a:s against the trustee in bankruptcy of the vendor 
and he takes at most only the naked legal title 
to the real property in trust for the assignee and 
the vendees.' ( ftn. 25). 
''Furthermore, a judgment against the ven-
dor attaches as a lien on the land which may be 
enforced, as against a purchaser in possession 
with notice, to the extent of the unpaid purchase 
price.'' See Bauermeister v. :.McDonald, supra. 
In Utah, therefore, under our statute, when a hus-
band and wife join in an executory sales contract, the 
wife has a distributive share interest in the equity re-
tained by the sellers, which she may assert against all 
the world, subject only to the right of the buyer upon 
his full performance. 
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'There is another line of cases deserving of the 
Court's attention in considering the question of what 
interests are dowable under an executory land contract. 
The Utah case in point is McNeil v. McNeil, et al., 61 
Ut. 141, 211 Pac. 988. There the husband was a buyer 
in ·an executory land contract not performed completely, 
and the widow claimed the statut'O·ry equivalent of dower 
in this interest at his death. The court held that since 
the contract was not completely performed, and equity 
would not at that time compel a conveyance of the land, 
the interest was not dowable. States in accord with this 
rule are Alabama, Georgia, illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, South Carolina and 
Tennessee. See 66 A.L.R., P. 67. If the wife of the buyer 
under such a contract has no dower, the seller must 
have a dowable interest; otherwise neither would get 
any and the way would be opened for men to bar dower 
on their wives simply by the use of a particular method 
of effecting a transfer of real property. Certainly the 
law would not sanction a device whereby two men could 
place both of their interests beyond the dower statute. 
''The title must vest somewhere; and since 
the decedent did not divest hilnself of it by his 
contract, it vested in those who were entitled 
tmder the law to take by succession, viz., the 
heirs.'' See Tyler v. Tyler, irvfra. 
Moreover, it has been held that it is contrary to 
the policy of the law to apply a technical doctrine to 
defeat a wife's dower. In Tyler v. Tyler, 50 Mont. 65, 
144 Pac. 1090, a husband and wife, for a consideration, 
gave to certain buyers the exclusive right to purchase 
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certain real estate in the form of an option. The deed, 
executed by both, was placed in escrow. When the hus .. 
band died before the purchaser exercised his right to 
purchase and before the deed was delivered, the wife 
claimed a share of the proceeds of the sale as dower. 
Defendants, the other heirs, claimed that under the 
''relation back" theory of escrow, the delivery to the 
purchaser was effective as of the time of delivery to the 
e~crow agent and no dower, therefore, could be awarded. 
The court held that the widow was entitled to the relief 
sought. It said: 
"The rule contended for by defendants is a 
fiction of law, applied by courts of equity in 
exceptional cases to sustain a conveyance which 
would otherwise fail of its purpose, and thus 
defeat the intentions of the parties. (Citing illus-
trative cases). It has application to cases where 
it is necessary to uphold a right. For example, 
it might be invoked to uphold the title in Forbes 
and Ector (the grantees) but it cannot be invoked 
to defeat the right of the plaintiff which attached 
before the second delivery.'' 
The court stated further that the widow was ''clear-
ly entitled to her dower in the proceeds of the sale. * * *'' 
What is the difference in substance between the 
facts of this case and the facts of the case at bar as far 
as the interest of a ·seller in a land contract is con-
cerned~ It is recognized, of course, that there is tech-
nical difference between an option contract and the 
executory real estate contract in evidence in this ease, 
but as a matter of substance and equity why should the 
wife under an executory contract be held to have any 
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less interest in the land it covers than if the same land 
had been conveyed under an option agreement~ It is 
submitted that particularly under our statutes the theory 
of the Tyler .case is controlling in the case at bar, and 
the Oourt should find that Mrs. Madsen retains an inter-
est in the property. 
We again emphasize to the Court that we do not 
believe that any legal effect can be given to the signature 
of Mrs. Madsen on the Peterson contract, since it is the 
case of a wife joining with a third person and is there-
fore not effective to convey inchoate dower. However, 
even if the Court finds that the Peterson oontract was 
joined by her as the wife of Mtr. l.J!ladsen, it is never-
theless clBar upon principle anvd (l!Uthority that she re-
~ains ·a distribulive share interest in the land which the 
plaintiff in this oa.se has no right to acquire. 
(d) The execution of a cont'rlact to selllarnd does not 
extinguish the seller's interest in1 .the Zand. 
It is, of course, an elementary principle of law that 
the seller not only has the legal title after the execution 
of an executory real estate contract, but that he also is 
the equitable owner of the land to the extent of the unpaid 
balance on the contract. In other words, there is only 
pro tonto conversion-only conversion to the extent 
that the purchase price is paid by the buyer. I:Q the 
case· at bar none ofthe money was paid to 1\irs. 1\Iadsen. 
She received· no consideration from anyone. Why should 
she now be"stripped of her right~ 
If A and B are tenants in cornmon of Blackacre 
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and they execute a contract whereby they agree to con-
vey to X by warranty deed upon the payn1ent of twelve 
monthly installments in the amount of one hundred 
dollars each, and X makes six monthly payments to A, 
can it be said that without paying more X acquired 
any right against B under his contract? Without ques-
tion the law would require the payments to be made 
to both A and B. On principle there is no reason why 
a buyer should be permitted to ignore the fact that the 
wife of the seller has an actual and subsisting, although 
inchoate, interest in the land. 
The dower interest has been zealously protected 
by courts of law for nearly one thousand years. It is 
a part of the genius of the Anglo-An1erican judicial · 
system It is designed to proteet wives against the 
eventualities of the decease of their husbands and against 
both co.J.spiring and unwitting trespass upon their mari-
tal rights. A buyer should not he permitted to assume 
that a seller will account to his wife for her share in 
the pruceeds of a contract any 1nore than he should he 
permitted to assume that he will obtain her signature 
on the deed without obtaining her signature on the con-
tract. The payments should have been made to Mr. and 
.Jfrs. :Madsen, as s·ellers, rather than simply to Mr. 
Uadsen. 
If one is constrained to feel sympathetic to'ward 
the Petersons, it is well, nevertheless, to take a look 
at the result as far as 1\irs. Madsen is concerned. She 
is the vietim of a device which not only prevents her 
from enjoying the proeeeds of the sale during her life-
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time, as she had every reason to anticipate, but under 
the decree of the tdal court ·she is precluded from any 
distributive interest either under the residuary clause 
of the will or under the distributive share statute of the 
estate with reference to real property. 
It is submitted that the Court erred in finding and 
concluding as a matter of law that Mrs. Madsen has no 
present interest in the land. 
POINT NO. IV 
THE SILENCE OF R. W. MADSEN, SR., AND THE 
PLAINTIFF, AND THEIR FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THE 
ALLEGED INTEREST OF THE PLAINTIFF IN THE LAND 
AT THE TIME OF THE EXECUTION OF THE PETERSON 
CONTRACT, CONSTITUTED A FRAUD UPON MRS. MAD-
SEN. PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO ACCOUNT 
TO HER FOR ONE-THIRD OF THE TOTAL SALES PRICE, 
AND SUCH RELIEF TO HER . SHOULD BE A CONDITION 
TO ANY RELIEF TO PLAINTIFF IN THIS ACTION. 
'The Court found that R. W. Madsen, Sr., sold the 
property involved to the plaintiff on J;anuary 1, 1937, 
for $10;680.00. After that time the property was carried 
on the books of the corporation and recognized by Mr. 
Madsen and the corporation as the property of the cor-
poration. (Findings of Fact Nos. 5 and 6). On June 
6, 1946, the Peterson contract was executed. The parties 
to the contract were James 0. Peterson ~and C. Amelia 
Peterson as buyers and Richard W. Madsen and LaReta 
C. :Madsen, his wife, as sellers. Since the Court found 
that l\ir. Madsen had conveyed his interest in the cor-
poration in 1937, Mr. Madsen had no interest to convey 
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at this tin1e, but the Court found ''That said Richard 
\Y. Madsen was in fact acting for and on behalf of 
Madsonia Realty Company in the signing of said con-
tract of sale." (Finding of Fact No. 6). l\fadsonia 
entered the sale on its books and Madsonia received all 
of the payments between the initial payment and the 
death of R. \V. Madsen. (Finding of Fact No. 6). 
The Court found, ''That LaReta C. signed said 
contract of June 6, 1946, vohmtarily as the wife of 
Richard \Y. l\fadsen. That there were no misrepresenta-
tions made to LaReta C. l\fadsen by Richard W. Madsen 
or any other person as an inducement to sign said con-
tract." (Finding of Fact No. 7). The Court found that 
~Irs. :Madsen signed the contract for the purpose of 
releasing her statutory dower right, and that at no time 
did either :\Ir. ~fadsen or the plaintiff, or any other 
person, agree to give any portion of the purchase price 
to :Jirs. Madsen. (Finding of Fact No. 7). 
It is clear that :Jirs. 1fadsen knew nothing of the 
alleged 1937 transaction between her husband and the 
corporation, and it is not questioned, and cannot be, 
that :Jirs. :Jiadsen did not know that the consideration 
all went to the corporation instead of to her. The Court 
found that ''neither at the time of the execution of the 
Peterson contract on or about June 6, 1946, nor at any 
time prior thereto, did defendant LaReta C. Madsen 
know that lfadsonia Realty Company had or claimed 
any right, title or interest in or to the aforesaid property; 
that at no tin1e did either Richard \V. :Madsen personally, 
nor did any other agent, officer or employee of Madsonia 
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Realty Company, take any step whatsoever to put said 
LaReta C. Madsen on notice of any claim or intere·st by 
the said corporation." (Finding of Fact No. 10, R. 74)'; 
Mrs. Madsen testified that she never discussed the 
Peterson contract with anyone other than R. W. Madsen; 
that Mr. l\iadsen brought it to their home and she signed 
it (R. 192). The record indicates that Mrs. Madsen 
believed all of the money from the sale of the home at 
667 East 4th South went into the joint bank account 
that she and her husband had at the Utah State National 
Bank (R. 202-203). 
There can be no question, in view of the findings 
of the Court, and as far as the record and facts are 
concerned, that Mrs. Madsen did not know that neither 
she nor her husband was to receive anything from the 
Peterson contract but that everything was going to the 
corporation. The failure to disclose these material facts 
was fraudulent. The Court found in effect that I\lr. 
Madsen was acting as a fiduciary of the corporation. 
He wrus also acting in a position of trust and confidence 
with reference to his wife. He did not disclose that he 
was acting in behalf of the corporation. He did not 
disclose that the consideration was not to go to him but 
to the corporation. ~e failed to exercise the high degre·e 
of good faith required of a husband towards his wife. 
Since he was acting for the corporation and the corpora-
tion had knowledge of his wrongful conduct, and since 
th'e corporation ,participated in the· trans·action, it is 
charged with this fraud and must bear the consequences. 
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The law is settled that remaining silent under cir-
cumstances creating an obligation to speak is as much 
a fraud as actual misrepresentation. 
''Fraud is the suppression of a fact by one 
who is bound to disclose it, or who gives infor-
mation of other facts which are likely to mislead 
for want of communication of that fact ; the sug-
gestion of a fact of that which is not true, by one 
who does not believe it to be true; also a fraud-
ulent misrepresentation by which one deceives 
another to the injury of the latter.'' 
26 C.J.S. 34 and cases cited. See also 26 
Corpus Juris, 1134 at Note 24, and see generally 
Corpus Juris, Fraud, Sections 54, 93 and 95. 
The law is stated by the editors of 37 C.J. Sec., p. 
244, Sec. 16 of the discussion on Fraud, as follows : 
''Where the particular circumstances impose 
on a person a duty to speak and he deliberately 
remains silent, his silence is equivalent to a false 
representation. 
''An exception to the rule that mere silence 
is not fraud exists where the circumstances impose 
on a person a duty to speak and he deliberately 
remains silent. It is well settled that the sup-
pression of a material fact which a party is bound 
in good faith to disclose is equivalent to a false 
representation. Where the law imposes a duty 
on one party to disclose all material. facts known 
to him and not known to the other, silence or con-
cealment in violation of this duty with intent 
to deceive will amount to fraud as being a deliber-
ate suppression of the truth, and equivalent to the 
assertion of a' falsehood. The concealment of a 
fact which one is bound to disclose is an indirect 
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representation that such fact does not exist, and 
constitutes fraud. A similar rule has in some 
jurisdictions been affirmed by express statutory 
provisions. Whether a duty to speak exists in a 
given cwse is a question depending on the peculiar 
facts involved. 
'' Misrepresenta~tions by third person. If one 
stands silent in the presence of a third person 
making misrepresentations which it is one's duty 
to correct, such silence constitutes a fraud. * * * 
''Where a relation of trust and confidence 
obtains between the parties, there is a duty to 
disclose all material facts, and failure to do so 
constitutes fraud. * * * 
"The rule applies, it has been said, wherever 
confidence is actually reposed by one person to 
the knowledge of the other.'' 
The kind of good faith and full disclosure required 
by a husband in transactions with his wife are illustrated 
by the case of Nissen v. Nissen Trampoline Co. (1949 
Sup. Ct. of Iowa), 39 N.W. (2d) 92. There the plaintiff 
and appellant was the wife of George P. Nissen during 
the time in question. Part of the property involved was 
owned in his own nam·e and part of it was owned by him 
and his wife as joint tenants. The defendant and appel-
lee, Nissen Trampoline Co., was a corporation and Mr. 
Nissen o'Wlled all of its stock. He had been its president 
since its organization and was acting as its president at 
the time of the execution of the deeds in question. Plain-
tiff contended that on or about the 1st day of March, 
1947, ·she signed certain blank instruments which were 
presented to her by her husband, with his e~planation 
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that they were papers in connection with the operation 
of the corporation. He represented to her that the docu-
ments were papers which required her signature ·as an 
officer of the corporation; in fact, the documents were 
deeds which conveyed three separate properties to the 
corporation. 
The Court discussed in detail the evidence concerning 
the circumstances at the time the deeds were signed, 
and concluded that the trial court erred in failing to find 
that the wife had been defrauded. The Court held that 
the corporation was liable for the acts of the husband 
since he \vas admittedly its agent, stating: 
"The liability ·of a principal for the acts of 
its agent growing out of the agent'·s knowledge 
of certain facts as well as the liability of a prin-
cipal under certain circumstances, including the 
situation where the agent is the sole representa-
tive of the principal, is commented upon in 2 Am. 
Jur. Agency, 300, par. 380, where it is stated: 
'A qualification of the rule that the knowledge 
of an agent engaged in an independent fraudulent 
act on his own account is not the knowledge of 
the principal has also been n1ade where the agent, 
though engaged in perpetrating an independent 
fraudulent act on his own account, is the sole 
repre'Sentative of the principal. It is held under 
such circumstances that the agent's knowledge 
is imputable to his own principal, and that the 
case falls within the general rule imputing the 
agent's knowledge to the principal. This quali-
fication to the exception has been applied in cases 
involving agents and officers of corporations as 
well as in cases involving agents and other prin-
cipals.' 
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''From a consideration of the many authori-
ties we find. the rule to be that a person is bound 
by the knowledge of his agent. This is predicated 
on ·the theory that it is the agent's duty to disclose 
all material facts coming to his knowledge with 
respect to the subject matter of his agency, and 
it is presumed that he has discharged that duty. 
There is, however, an exception to this rule in 
eases where the knowledge of the agent is obtained 
while he is engaged in committing an independent 
fraudulent act on his own part, the communication 
of which to the principal would necessarily pre-
vent its consummation. This exception or quali-
fication is further qualified in the case of a fraud-
ulent agent who is the sole representative of the 
principal and under such circumstances the im-
puted knowledge of the principal applies. See 
Annotations 48 A.L.R. 464, 468 and cases cited; 
Annotations 86 A.L.R. 537 and Annotations 2 
L.R.A. (N.S.) 994 and cases cited." 
The Court held that the acts of the husband in rela-
tion to his wife in the obtaining of her stock were fraud-
ulent in character and that the evidence was clear, satis-
factory and convincing. The Court discussed the rela-
tionship between the husband and wife in the following 
language: 
"rrhe relationship between the appellant, the 
wife and George P. Nissen, her husband, was 
such as to create a confidential and fiduciary rela-
tionship. It has been our hold~ng that where a 
fjduciary or confidential reladon is sho,vn to exist 
'between the parties to a' transaction the burden 
is upon 'the one claiming a benefit. therefrom to 
establish entire fairness on the part of the party 
benefitted. First National· Bank v. Ten N a pel, 
198 Iowa 816, 819, 200 N.W. 405. ·There can be 
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no doubt in this pre·sent case as to the confidential 
relationship between the appellant and George P. 
Nis·sen. It is true there was no confidential rela-
tionship between the appellant and the corpora-
tion but the fact that Nissen was the sole repre-
sentative of the corporation in the transfer of 
the properties while acting in a confidential rela-
tionship to his wife can and should be taken into 
consideration in our determination of this case.'' 
It is settled law that a husband cannot so conduct 
his affairs that his wife is misled into a release of her 
dower right interest by fraudulent misrepresentations. 
In K ratli v. Booth, et a.l., 191 N.E. 180, 99 Ind. App. 
178, a husband by fraudulent representations induced 
his wife to execute a deed to certain real property to a 
nominal trustee without consideration. After the hus-
band's death the trustee conveyed the land to the chil-
dren and grandchildren of the husband. The Court found 
that the widow wa:s not divested of her interest because 
of the fraud practiced upon her in the inception and 
execution of the deed, and that the children and grand-
children, having knowledge of the fraud, were not in a 
position to object to the allotment of her dower. The 
Court said: 
"Husband and wife occupy a relation of spe-
cial trust and confidence toward each other, and 
owe, one to the other, the utmost good faith. 
Whenever the confidence resulting from such a 
relationship is abused, equity will intervene to 
right the wrong." (Citing cases, see Page 182, 
Northeast Reporter.) 
Further said the Court: 
''As between husband and wife, the husband, 
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in the absence o.f facts showing otherwi•se, is pre-
sumed to exercise a superior dominating influence 
over the wife in ·business affairs to such an extent 
that she depends upon and suffers her conduct 
to be eon trolled by his wish and judgment." 
The Court said that the husband induced the wife 
to join in the execution of the deed to the trustee with 
a promi•se that it would be sold and the proceeds in-
vested. The husband's purpose was to have the bank 
convey the land to his children and grandchildren ana 
to defeat the wife's rights as his wife or surviving 
widow. 
''He did not exercise that high degree of 
honor and good faith toward his wife, and make 
a complete disclosure of all the facts surrounding 
the conveyance which the law demands from a 
husband when dealing with her in matters affect-
ing her property and marital rights. 'He owed 
to her the utmost good faith and frankness.' 
These important duties he failed to fulfill. He 
concealed from appellant the important fact that 
he had an oral agreement with the bank to ·convey 
the land to appellee. He did not intend at that 
time to carry out the promise which he made to 
appellant to induce her to sign the deed. 'A 
present state of mind is a present state of fact. 
It was a fraud upon appellant to conceal from 
her his intention to have the real estate conveyed 
to his children and grandchildren. Basye v. Basye, 
supra. 
"It has been held in this state that when one 
person designedly and knowingly causes a false 
impression or belief to be entertained by another, 
and the latter is thereby induced to make a con-
tract injurious to his interests, such a contract 
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is so impressed "''ith fraud that the courts will 
set the ·sa1ne aside.' Kemery v. Zeigler ( 1912) 176 
Ind. 660, 96 N.E. 950, 95±; Sherrin v. Flinn (1900) 
155 Ind. 422, 58 N.E. 5-!9; see "\V estphal v. Heck-
man, supra. 
• 'Equity regards the substance of a transac-
tion and not the forn1. This conveyance was made 
to a nominal tn1stee without consideration, it 
never accepted or had the management or control 
of the property, and after the death of John G. 
Kratli pursuant to his oral instructions, without 
consideration and at their request, conveyed the 
property to the appellees. They were not inno-
cent purchasers for value and received the real 
estate burdened with any rights which the appel-
lant had therein as surviving widow of her de-
ceased husband. 
''Facts not found in a special finding, as to 
such omitted facts, amount to a finding against 
the party having the burden of proof. The bur-
den was upon the appellees in this case to estab-
lish the fact that when John G. Kratli induced 
appellant to sign and acknowledge the deed to 
the bank, he acted in perfect good faith, that he 
took no advantage of his influence or knowledge, 
and that the contract wa·s fair, adequate, and 
equitable. ~fcCord v. Bright, supra. The special 
finding of facts fails to show that appellees have 
discharged this burden. vV e hold therefore that 
on the special finding of facts and the presump-
tions of law that prevail in cases of this char-
acter, the execution of the deed from John G. 
Kratli and appellant to the bank was, as to her, 
procured by fraud practiced upon her by her 
husband, and was therefore void and not binding 
upon her, and that •she is entitled to have her 
title quieted in a life estate in an undivided one 
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third of the lands of her deceased husband, as 
against the appellees.'' 
The Court's attention is invited 'to the remarkable 
similarities in the case at bar. Here, Mr. Madsen con-
veyed to the corporation without hi.s wife's knowledge. 
Then, without disclos,ing the interest of the corporation, 
and without drsclo'Sing the fact that he was receiving no 
consideration, and without disclosing the facts of the 
case, and while acting, according to the theory of plain-
tiff and the trial court, as trustee and agent of the plain-
tiff, he presented to his wife a contract which he said was 
to convey ''our home''. The corporation had knowledge 
of the real facts and knew that Mrs. Madsen had no 
knowledge of them. It participated in the transaction. 
Mr. Madsen then claimed that the stock in t'he corpora-
tion was held by his two 'Sons, or in the will admitted 
to probate he left all of the stock in the corporation to 
them. The result of the transaction was to exclude his 
wife's interest and to prevent her from receiving any 
benefits under the contraCJt which she was fraudulently 
induced to sign. Certainly a court of equity should scru-
tinize closely the entire transaction and should prevent 
the plaintiff from being enriched by its own fraudulent 
conduct. 
In connectiop_ with the goo<;! faith required of a hus-
band toward hi'S wife in transaetions concerning prop-
erty in' which·. she has an inchoate. dower interest, the 
attention of .the Court is invited to Stokes v. Stokes 
. (1922), 196 N.Y. Sup. 184, 119 N.Y. Misc. 1'68. In that 
case the wife·. brought an action alleging ( 1) that two 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
57 
i, deeds were executed without consideration; (2) that their 
exec.ution was obtained by fraud, coercion, suppression 
J:!. of facts and undue influence; (3) that the wife may not 
release her inchoate dower to her husband, and ( 4) that 
the procuring of her signature on the deeds in question 
wa:s for the purpose of defrauding her in obtaining the 
release of her inchoate dower right in the property. 
The husband claimed that there was an antenuptial 
agreement but he could not produce it, and the Court 
doubted its existence. The deeds in question were signed 
three months after the marriage of the parties, when 
the husband came to the wife's bedroom and asked her 
to sign them. The grantee was a corporation in which 
the husband owned all of the sto'Ck. The husband did 
not record the deeds until eight years later, when diffi-
culty arose between the parties. The Court said that 
it was an elementary principle that a wife could not 
release her inchoarte dower as to her husband. 
''May she, by joining in a deed to a corpora-
tion, the stock of which is entirely owned by her 
husband, release that dower right 1 The corpora-
tion is ordinarily to be considered a separate 
entity, but when I consider all the circumstances 
before me-the claim of an antenuptial agree-
ment and the evidence introduced to sustain that 
claim ; the non-production of the agreement; the 
withholding of the deed to the corporation by 
defendant Stokes for over eight years; his pos-
session of it during all of that time; the facts 
attendant upon the execution of the deeds a:s evi-
denced bv the oral and documentary evidence~! 
do not b~lieve a court of equity should be estop-
ped by a mere legal fiction of 'entity'." 
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The Court . said that it would not permit a mere 
device or contrivance to be used to do away with her 
inchoate right, and quoted Hayes v .. Hemry, 1 Md. Ch. 
337, as follows : 
''One of the badges of· fraud in such case is 
the relation of the possession of the property 
by the husband after the transfer of the title, 
or keeping the deed in his hands after its execu-
tion.'' 
The Court dis'cussed the superior knowledge of the 
husband, and the fact that he was a dominant party, 
and concluded that she was misled into not scrutinizing 
the instruments because of her trust in her husband's 
good faith. The relief prayed for by the wife was 
granted. 
Can there be any doubt that the fact that the con-
sideration in the Peterson contract was intended to go 
and did go to the corporation was a material fact, the 
suppression of which constitutes fraud~ Mrs. :Madsen 
had a legal relationship toward her husband; she shared 
in a joint bank account with him; she had an interest 
as his wife in his property; she expected that he was 
going to get the money under the Peterson contract. 
She had no legal relationship to the corporation, as to 
which she was legally a total stranger. It is an empty 
answer to say that she would have signed even if she 
had known of the facts; The -case is to be decided on the 
facts as they occurred and not upon some speculation 
as to what 1night have been the result of different facts . 
. It is submitted that the Court erred in failing to 
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conclude that the acts of t·he plaintiff and Mr. Mads·en 
constituted a fraud upon ~Irs. :Madsen, and that she 
should receive an accounting frmn the corporation of 
one-third of the amounts received by it under the Peter-
son contract, and that she should further be awarded 
an a1nount equal to on-e-third of the present value of the 
contract, including interest. Less than this relief permits 
the corporation to profit by its fraud. As framed, the 
decree is inequitable, unrealistic and contrary to la.w. 
CONCLUSION 
If the Court agrees with appellants that the action 
of the plaintiff is barred either by. the statute of frauds 
or the statute of limitations, then the Court must still 
detennine whether !irs. :Jladsen was defrauded and 
whether the plaintiff must account to her for one-third 
of the moneys it has already received on the Peterson 
contract. If the Court agrees with Point No. III of 
appellants and finds that ~Irs. :Jiadsen still has a one-
third interest in the property, then the Court will not 
be required to pass upon the problem raised by Point 
IY of the argument, because l\Irs. :Madsen will still have 
the rights which the Court found she had released to 
the Petersons. At least with reference to the n10ney still 
to be paid under the contract, Points III and IV of the 
argument are alternative positions and should be con-
sidered as such. 
In any event, it is clear beyond question that the 
trial court erred in depriving ~Irs. ~Iadsen of any inter-
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est whatsoever in both the land or the sales price under 
the contract. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McKAY, BURTON, McMILLAN 
AND RICHARDS, 
Attotrneys ~o~r Appellamts. 
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